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I. INTRODUCTION
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals deviated from the Circuit's
prior precedent in announcing its decision in Lindo v. NCL. I The holding
innuendo overruled Thomas v. Carnival Cruise Lines, decided by Judge
Barkett on the Eleventh Circuit in 2009.2 Rather than explicitly overrule
Thomas, the Court of Appeals acrobatically differentiated Lindo by rein-
* In memory of my Father, Michael P. Burke.
1. Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1277-80 (1 1th Cir. 2011).
2. Id.
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terpreting the United States Supreme Court decision in Mitsubishi's
Footnote 19.1
This novel interpretation allowed the Eleventh Circuit to compel
arbitration of a foreign seaman's claim while holding that such procedu-
ral manipulation did not prospectively waive the seaman's United States
statutory rights.4 Even though Lindo's holding conflicts with the
Supreme Court's analysis in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth Inc.,' the Eleventh Circuit extended Lindo in Henriquez v.
NCL to include seamen's common law maintenance and cure claims.6
Thus, within one month, the Eleventh Circuit overruled its holding in
Thomas and substantially altered seamen's rights and remedies in con-
flict with the Jones Act7 and recent Supreme Court decisions regulating
the enforcement of arbitration provisions.8
This Casenote analyzes the holding announced in Lindo v. NCL. It
begins with an overview of Lindo and discusses the Eleventh Circuit's
precedent in arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). The
Casenote then discusses the Supreme Court's arbitration precedent and
the ability to waive U.S. statutory rights in contractual agreements. This
Part includes various opinions, expressed in dicta, which provide gui-
dance to the Court's current stance on union-negotiated collective bar-
gaining agreements.
After analyzing the Supreme Court's related precedent, the Case-
note presents the facts of Lindo and the Eleventh Circuit's rationale in
the opinion. This rationale includes a comparison of Eleventh Circuit
cases leading up to Lindo. The Casenote concludes with an analysis of
the Jones Act, including its legislative history and purpose, and the
Supreme Court's interpretation and application. The Jones Act analysis
will lead into a discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
FAA and how lower courts have responded. In addition to the precedent
on the books, this Casenote will look at the proposed legislative amend-
ments to the FAA. The Casenote concludes with the proposed amend-
ments, their purpose, and will lead into a public policy discussion of
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636-37 n.19
(1985).
6. Henriquez v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 440 F. App'x 714, 715 (1lth Cir. 2011).
7. See Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 311-12 (1970) (stating that the
language of the Jones Act by its terms "is not limited to American seaman nor to vessels bearing
the American flag").
8. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974) (holding "In sum, Title
VlH's purpose and procedures strongly suggest that an individual does not forfeit his private cause




union-negotiated arbitration clauses contained in collective bargaining
agreements.
II. BACKGROUND
Harold Leonel Pineda Lindo ("Lindo") is a citizen and resident of
Nicaragua. 9 Norwegian Cruise Line ("NCL") employed Lindo as a sea-
man aboard the M/S Norwegian Dawn.1" The employment contract
signed by Lindo stipulated to submission of all claims arising from
employment to arbitration. I1 The forum selection clause fixed arbitration
in Lindo's home country, 12 Nicaragua, and the choice of law provision
dictated that Bahamian law would apply.' 3 During his employment,
Lindo sustained back injuries while carrying heavy trash bags, which
subsequently required corrective surgery. 4
In 2009, Lindo filed suit in Florida state court asserting violations
of the Jones Act, pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 30104.11 In addition to his
Jones Act negligence claims, Lindo claimed: failure to provide mainte-
nance and cure, failure to provide adequate medical treatment, unsea-
worthiness, and disability benefits under the collective bargaining
agreement ("CBA").
16
NCL removed the case under 9 U.S.C. § 20517 to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida and moved to compel
arbitration pursuant to the CBA.' 8 Lindo amended his complaint, limit-
ing his cause of action to a single claim of Jones Act negligence. 9 Lindo
opposed NCL's motion and sought remand to state court.20
Raising the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Thomas, Lindo argued
that the arbitration provision, contained in the CBA, was void as a pro-
spective waiver of his Jones Act claim.2' In the alternative, Lindo con-
tested the validity of the arbitration clause under Florida state law,
arguing that the provision failed because it neglected to inform Lindo of
the costs associated with arbitration.22 The district court denied Lindo's
9. Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1260.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1260-61.
12. Id. at 1261.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1260.
15. Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1261.
16. Id.
17. 9 U.S.C.A. § 205.
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motion for remand, granted NCL's motion to compel arbitration, and
dismissed Lindo's amended complaint.23
Lindo appealed." The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the contract's arbitration provision was not void as a matter of public
policy, did not prospectively waive Lindo's U.S. statutory rights, and
thus, compelled arbitration to Nicaragua under the application of Baha-
mian law.25
A. The Federal Arbitration Act Conflicts with the Eleventh Circuit's
Holding in Bautista v. Star Cruises
The Eleventh Circuit's holding in Lindo, compelling arbitration of
seamen's claims, is unambiguously in conflict with the language and
purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act.2 6 The FAA expressly prohibits
seamen claims from being submitted to arbitration for resolution. 7
Chapter 1, Section 1 of the FAA dictates that the Act is inapplicable to
"contracts of employment of seaman, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. '28 Despite
the code's clear language, the Eleventh Circuit held that Chapter 1 of the
FAA does not apply to arbitration agreements involving foreign parties,
but rather, only the defenses in Chapter 2 of the FAA are available to
parties in international contracts .29 The Circuit's interpretation of the
FAA not only conflicts with the legislative history of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, 30 it disagrees with this country's long-standing practice of
23. Id.
24. Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1262.
25. Id. at 1287.
26. 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West) (The exemption provision of the Federal Arbitration Act specifies:
"but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.").
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1296 (1lth Cir. 2005) (holding "The statutory
framework of title 9 and the language and context of the Convention Act preclude the application
of the FAA seamen's exemption, either directly as an integral part of the Convention Act or
residually as a non-conflicting provision of the FAA.").
30. H.R. REP. No. 91-1181, at 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601, at 3603.
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, WHICH HAS BEEN CODIFIED IN
TITLE 9 OF THE U.S.C. EMBODIES BASIC NATIONAL POLICY
CONCERNING ARBITRATION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, WHICH INCLUDES
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ...
SUGGESTED THAT THE DEPARTMENT DISCUSS WITH A SMALL GROUP
OF REPRESENTATIVES ... THE MOST EFFECTIVE APPROACH TO THE
IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION. THE CONSENSUS OF THE GROUP, WITH
WHICH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONCURS, WAS THAT RATHER
THAN AMENDING A SERIES OF SECTIONS OF THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO ENACT A NEW
[Vol. 67:893
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protecting seamen as wards of admiralty.31
B. The Jones Act
The Jones Act was enacted to protect seamen as a class of persons
subjected to harsh working conditions and reality of marine life. 32 Con-
cerns over evasive business practices spawned the First Congress to
enact legislation 33 designed to serve a regulatory function and ensure
ship owners effectuated appropriate measures to protect their crew.34
Because Congress was troubled by the historical oppression of seamen,
it sought to afford the same protection to seaman as it had to railroad
employees.
The purpose of the Act was not only to provide a shield, but also to
afford a sword to the abused class. The sword allowed seamen, domestic
and foreign, to bring their claims in negligence in United States Federal
Courts.36 The Act lessened the burden of proving causation and provided
compensation to injured seamen.37 Providing an adequate judicial
forum, lessening the negligence standard, and creating an accessible
platform to vindicate seamen rights was the focus and purpose of the
CHAPTER DEALING EXCLUSIVELY WITH RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS FALLING UNDER THE CONVENTION. THIS
APPROACH WOULD LEAVE UNCHANGED THE LARGELY SETTLED
INTERPRETATION OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT BUT NOT
UNDER THE CONVENTION.
31. See Bainbridge v. Merchants' & Miners' Transp. Co., 287 U.S. 278, 282 (1932) (stating
"Seamen have always been regarded as wards of the admiralty, and their rights, wrongs, and
injuries a special subject of the admiralty jurisdiction.").
32. Resp't Br., Hellenic Lines Limited, 398 U.S. 396, 1970 WL 136482, at *15 (2004)
(arguing the Jones Act, "In its plain language and operation, it is broad in scope, giving protection
to all seamen injured in their employment in which the United States has a legitimate interest.").
33. Harrington v. Atl. Sounding Co., Inc., 602 F.3d 113, 131 (2d Cir. 2010) (Calabresi, J.
dissenting), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1054 (2011) (stating "The [Jones] Act followed a long
tradition of solicitude for the rights and interests of seamen by both legislatures and courts that
dates back to the First Congress.").
34. Id. at 4 (stating "This nation must not permit foreign-flag ships to take advantage of our
benefits equally with the American merchant marine, and, simultaneously, evade the
accompanying obligations.").
35. Rory Bahadur, Constitutional History, Federal Arbitration and Seamen's Rights Sinking
in A Sea of Sweatshop Labor, 39 J. MAR. L. & COM. 157, 171 (2008) (arguing Jones Act claims
are not removable to federal court as they were enacted under the Federal Employees Liability
Act, which bars removal in cases of personal injury to railway employees).
36. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 398 U.S. at 310 (holding "The flag, the nationality of the seaman, the
fact that his employment contract was Greek, and that he might be compensated there are in the
totality of the circumstances of this case minor weights in the scales compared with the substantial
and continuing contacts that this alien owner has with this country.").
37. Harrington, 602 F.3d at 138 (stating "This Circuit continues to recognize the distinctive
nature of FELA and the Jones Act by applying relaxed standards of negligence and causation to
claims brought under those statutes.").
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Jones Act.38
Motivated by concern over ships flying flags of convenience and
circumventing U.S. labor laws, Congress enacted the Jones Act to pro-
tect seamen porting in U.S. territories. 39 However, the Eleventh Circuit's
holding in Lindo strips the Jones Act of its legislative purpose. By com-
pelling arbitration of seamen claims to foreign tribunals, under foreign
law, the Eleventh Circuit endorses the exact type of evasive business
practices Congress sought to prevent. The aftermath of Lindo effectively
allows ship owners to register ships in foreign countries and stipulate to
a favorable choice of law and continue oppression of seamen. The deci-
sion steals the seamen's sword, the sword Congress granted centuries
ago.
C. The Eleventh Circuit Reinterprets Footnote 19
In Thomas v. Carnival Cruise Lines, the Eleventh Circuit inter-
preted the Supreme Court's dicta in Mitsubishi's Footnote 19 to guide its
holding.4 ° Footnote 19 expressed the Court's hesitation in compelling
arbitration when a contract's choice of law and forum selection clause
act in tandem to prospectively waive U.S. statutory rights.4 In Thomas,
Judge Barkett determined that the Supreme Court's concern of prospec-
tive waiver as expressed in Footnote 19 of Mitsubishi was indicative to
her outcome.42
The Circuit held that granting the cruise line's motion to compel
arbitration to the Philippines, under Panamanian law, would act as a
prospective waiver of Thomas's U.S. statutory rights (Seaman's Wage
Act claim).4 3 In refusing to compel arbitration, the Eleventh Circuit
highlighted that the stipulated choice of law (Panamanian) prevented
Thomas from vindicating his U.S. statutory right." Furthermore, sub-
mission of his claims to a foreign tribunal, under foreign law, may result
in no award, which would be effectively unreviewable (violating the
FAA).45 Because the Supreme Court's language dictates hesitation in
compelling arbitration that would waive a litigant's U.S. statutory rights,
38. Id. at 136.
39. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 398 U.S. at 315 (defending its holding by arguing that Congress was
weary of "the practice of American owners of finding a 'convenient' flag 'to avoid stringent
shipping laws by seeking foreign registration eagerly offered by some countries"').
40. See Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113, 1121 (11th Cir. 2009).
41. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. 614, n.19.
42. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1121.
43. Id. at 1124.




the Eleventh Circuit erred by deviating from Thomas and reinterpreting
Mitsubishi's Footnote 19 when it announced its decision in Lindo.
D. The Eleventh Circuit Deviated from Prior Circuit Precedent
In Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend, Chief Judge Edmond-
son announced that under the Eleventh Circuit's precedent, a panel may
only depart from an earlier panel's decision when an intervening
Supreme Court decision compels departure and is "clearly on point."
4 6
The interlocutory appeal arose after the district court refused to strike
the seaman's request for punitive damages.47
On 5 July 2005, Defendant, a seaman and crew member of the Motor
Tug Thomas, allegedly slipped and landed shoulder first on the steel
deck of the vessel, injuring his shoulder and clavicle. According to
[the seaman], [the tug owners] advised him that they would not pro-
vide him with maintenance and cure, which covers medical care, a
living allowance, and wages for seamen who become ill or are
injured while serving aboard a vessel. [The tug owners] then filed this
suit for declaratory relief on the question of their obligations in this
matter.48
In Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc., an Eleventh Circuit panel announced
that seamen are able to recover punitive damages when an employer
arbitrarily and willfully refuses to pay maintenance and cure. 49 In Atlan-
tic Sounding, the seaman's employer argued that the Supreme Court's
decision in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., which announced that punitive
damages are unavailable under the general maritime law in a wrongful
death action, abrogated Hines.5 ° On interlocutory appeal, the Circuit
examined whether the court could depart from its holding in Hines,
based on the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Miles.5' Chief
Judge Edmondson reiterated the importance of adhering to settled law of
the Circuit: "[o]bedience to a Supreme Court decision is one thing,
extrapolating from its implications a holding on an issue that was not
before that Court in order to upend settled circuit law is another thing."52
46. Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend, 496 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2007) aff'd and
remanded, 129 S. Ct. 2561 (U.S. 2009).
47. Id. at 1283-84.
48. Id.
49. Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc., 820 F.2d 1187, 1189 (11 th Cir. 1987) (stating "this Court held
that punitive damages are recoverable under general maritime law upon a showing of a
shipowner's willful and wanton misconduct in a death action").
50. Atd. Sounding Co., Inc., 496 F.3d at 1283.
51. Id. at 1284.
52. Id. (citing Main Drug, Inc. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 475 F.3d 1228, 1230 (11th
Cir.2007) (concluding that the Supreme Court's determination that the time requirement in Fed. R.
Crim. P. 33 was not jurisdictional did not "relieve[ ] us from the obligation to follow our prior
panel decisions holding that the requirements of Appellate Rule 5 are jurisdictional")).
2013]
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In Miles, the Supreme Court strictly announced that damages for
loss of society were unavailable under general maritime law in seaman
death causes of action.13 The holding, however, did not extend to main-
tenance and cure or personal injury claims.54 Holding Miles to a limited
reading, the Eleventh Circuit refused to deny the seaman's request for
punitive damages in Atlantic Sounding.55 The Eleventh Circuit refused
to overrule its prior decision in Hines based on the Supreme Court's
rationale in Miles.
56
Lindo's deviation from the Circuit's holding in Thomas violates the
principle announced in Atlantic Sounding. In order to avoid overruling a
prior panel decision, Judge Hull sidestepped Thomas's holding. Instead,
of overruling Thomas the judge proclaimed that Thomas was incorrect in
its application of the prospective waiver doctrine (Mitsubishi's Footnote
19).57
In defending his holding, the district judge stated that the FAA's
Article V public policy defense could only be raised at the enforcement
of an award, not when challenging an arbitration agreement.58 Article V
of the FAA's public policy defense dictates that enforcement of an arbi-
tral award may be refused when enforcement "would be contrary to the
public policy of that country. '59 In Thomas, the Circuit interpreted this
language to conclude that a seaman could challenge the choice of law
contained in an arbitration agreement when the choice of law and forum
selection clause act in tandem to waive the seaman's U.S. statutory
rights.60 Because Footnote 19 explicitly stated that an arbitration agree-
ment would not be upheld if it prospectively waived a litigant's rights,
Judge Barkett held that the public policy defense was available to a liti-
gant challenging an agreement, not just an award.
The decision in Lindo therefore not only violates the rationale in
Mitsubishi and Thomas, it conflicts with the Circuit's prohibition
announced in Atlantic Sounding, which refuses to allow the Circuit to
deviate from prior precedent absent an on-point Supreme Court
decision.61
53. Id. at 1285.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1288. The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Atlantic
Sounding, ruling that punitive damages are available for willful and wanton disregard of seaman's
maintenance and cure claims.
56. Id.
57. Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1284 (holding that the public policy defense may only be invoked at
the arbitral award-enforcement stage, not the initial arbitration-enforcement stage).
58. Id.
59. New York Convention, art. V(2)(b), June 10, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 21 U.S.T. 2517.
60. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1121.
61. Atl. Sounding Co., Inc., 496 F.3d at 1286.
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E. Other Courts' Reliance on Thomas
The Southern District of New York relied on Thomas's holding and
rationale when it announced its holding in Dumitru v. Princess Cruise
Lines.6 z Discussing Mitsubishi, the district court noted that the Supreme
Court "upheld the arbitration provision [in Mitsubishi] because... U.S.
law would be applied in arbitration"6 3 and "the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum."64 The district court heeded to the logic and plain meaning of
Footnote 19: "in the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law
clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to
pursue statutory remedies . . . we would have little hesitation in con-
demning the agreement as against public policy."65
The court then turned to the Supreme Court's rationale in Vimar,
which compelled arbitration to Japan when the choice of law was
ambiguous but the Court would have the "opportunity to review the out-
come of arbitration at a later stage."66 In conducting its own analysis, the
Southern District of New York considered the Eleventh Circuit's inter-
pretation of Mitsubishi's Footnote 19.
Synthesizing these two cases, the Eleventh Circuit in Thomas v. Car-
nival Corp. declared that "arbitration clauses should be upheld if it is
evident that either U.S. law definitely will be applied or if there is a
possibility that it might apply and there will be later review." Apply-
ing this approach, the Thomas court invalidated an agreement to arbi-
trate a Seaman's Wage Act claim in the Philippines under
Panamanian law, finding that the choice-of-law and choice-of-venue
provisions "operated in tandem to completely bar Thomas from rely-
ing on any U.S. statutorily-created causes of action," and that the
court had "no opportunity for review" because of the "distinct possi-
bility" that the plaintiff would receive no award under Panamanian
law.67
In Asignacion v. Schiffahrts, the Eastern District of Louisiana opted
to follow the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Thomas after a thorough dis-
cussion of the legislative purpose and history of the Jones Act.68 The
case was a question of first impression for the Fifth Circuit.69 Having
never determined the enforceability of forum selection clause and choice
62. Dumitru v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 732 F. Supp. 2d 328, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
63. Id.
64. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 637.
65. Dumitru, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Asignacion v. Schiffahrts, Slip. Op., No. CIV.A. 11-627, 2011 WL 2118740, at *6-7
(E.D. La. May 25, 2011) appeal dismissed, 11-30546, 2012 WL 13773 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2012).
69. Id. at *4.
2013]
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of law clause in an international arbitration agreement, the district court
examined Supreme Court precedent and relevant circuits' interpreta-
tions.70 Upon full analysis, the district court held that public policy com-
manded the court to sever the choice of law provision in the seaman
contract. 71 Despite conflicts with the Circuit's precedent, the court
elected to differentiate the case from Haynsworth v. The Corp. and fol-
low the Eleventh Circuit's rationale in Thomas.
72
In Haynsworth, the Fifth Circuit "held that a forum selection clause
requiring suit in England and a choice of law clause providing for the
application of English law in the investors' agreement did not violate
public policy. ' 73 In distinguishing the two cases, the district court stated
that although the "reasoning in Haynsworth would appear to apply to the
instant case, the Court finds that the instant case is distinguishable given
that Philippine law, unlike English law, will not afford Plaintiff adequate
protection. '74 The court concluded, "Unlike American securities laws,
which typically govern disputes between sophisticated parties, the Fifth
Circuit has recognized that the Jones Act serves a unique purpose in
protecting seamen as wards of admiralty. ' 75 Because of the unique
nature of the individual rights established for seamen, Judge Zainey held
that a plaintiffs Jones Act claims could not be compelled to arbitration
under foreign law as it would constitute a prospective waiver of the sea-
man's U.S. statutory rights.76
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S PERSPECTIVE ON PROSPECTIVE WAIVER
Arbitration clauses are increasingly more commonplace in today's
global economy. Over the past decade, courts have faced numerous chal-
lenges in interpreting the validity of arbitration provisions. Throughout
this experimental period, judges have been hesitant to uphold arbitration
agreements when the litigant contesting the provision demonstrates that
the contract or the arbitration clause itself is unconscionable. Courts
often find employment agreements to be especially susceptible to invalid
arbitration agreements. Unequal bargaining power steers the sign-on
worker to consent to submission of his claims to an unfamiliar or com-
pletely unknown tribunal, which has been found to violate the require-
ment that a litigant's waiver be "knowing and intelligent."
70. Id. at *4-7.
71. Id. at *7.
72. Id. at *8.
73. Id. (citing Haynsworth v. The Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 968-69 (5th Cir. 1997)).
74. Asignacion, supra note 68, at *8.
75. Id.
76. Id. at *7.
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Despite treaty ratification in 1970,"7 only recently have courts
started to observe the Federal Arbitration Act's pro-arbitration stance.
This novel homage to comity and international relations places a strain
on courts trying to blend U.S. statutory rights with respect to interna-
tional affairs. Contractual agreements to arbitrate claims are typically
upheld when the agreement simply alters the forum to vindicate a liti-
gant's rights. However, hesitation is rightfully counseled when an arbi-
tration agreement alters those rights. The Supreme Court has provided
some guidance in determining the validity of arbitration agreements.
A. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
In 1974, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., which held that a litigant was not foreclosed from
bringing his Title VII claim in federal court after already being submit-
ted for resolution in a prior arbitration.78 Justice Powell, delivering the
opinion for the unanimous court, stated "Title VII's purpose and proce-
dures strongly suggest that an individual does not forfeit his private
cause of action if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under
the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement. 79
Justice Powell went on to write:
Title VII's strictures are absolute and represent a congressional com-
mand that each employee be free from discriminatory practices. Of
necessity, the rights conferred can form no part of the collective-bar-
gaining process since waiver of these rights would defeat the para-
mount congressional purpose behind Title VII. In these
circumstances, an employee's rights under Title VII are not suscepti-
ble of prospective waiver.8°
The decision announced in Alexander demonstrates the Court's
reluctance to compel arbitration of U.S. statutory claims, especially
those that afford individual rights. When Congress acts to protect indi-
vidual rights, and resolution of those rights in an arbitral forum would
skirt the legislative purpose and objective, the Court heeds to Congress's
direction. 81 Thus, courts are reluctant to uphold contractual arbitration
agreements when agreeing to submit the claims to arbitration conflicts
with Congress's regulatory scheme.82 The Supreme Court reiterated this
concern in Footnote 19 of Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, dis-
77. MICHAEL A. ROSENHOUSE, Confirmation of Foreign Arbitral Award Under Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 194 A.L.R. FED 291, at * 1 (2004).
78. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60.
79. Id. at 49.
80. Id. at 51-52.
81. See generally id.
82. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. 614, n.19 (1985).
2013]
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cussed infra.83
B. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. and Wilko v. Swan
The same year as Alexander, the Court decided Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co.84 In Scherk, the Court honored the United States' participa-
tion in the FAA and compelled arbitration of an American company's
Securities Exchange Act claims to resolution in Paris." Differentiating
its holding from Wilko v. Swan,86 the Court reasoned that the forum
selection clause in Scherk was valid because it was the product of an
international dispute, not a domestic conflict.87 Because the FAA super-
sedes U.S. statutory law in international commercial transactions, the
statutory provision vesting exclusive jurisdiction in a particular forum
was null in an international contract.
88
In Wilko, the Court refused to compel arbitration because the rele-
vant section of the Securities Act prevented the litigants from "waiving
compliance with any provision of this subchapter."89 The Court held that
by contractually agreeing to submit their claims to arbitration, the parties
engaged in an unauthorized waiver of compliance, and thus invalidated
the arbitration agreement. 90 Conversely, in Scherk, the contract encoun-
tered conflicting substantive law and choice of law rules because the
conflict arose out of an international dispute. 9'
In Scherk, Alberto-Culver Company was an American company
and Scherk was a German citizen residing in Switzerland. 92 The contract
was negotiated in both Europe and the United States, and ultimately
effectuated in Austria. 93 The contract stipulated to resolution of any dis-
pute in an arbitral tribunal in Paris, France, with application of Illinois
law.94 The difference between the Securities Exchange Act claims being
brought between domestic litigants and international litigants was suffi-
cient enough for the Court to uphold the international agreement for
83. Id.
84. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
85. Id. at 519-20.
86. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
87. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515-17.
88. Id. at 515-20.
89. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35 (stating "The words of § 14, note 6, supra, void and
'stipulation' waiving compliance with any 'provision' of the Securities Act. This arrangement to
arbitrate is a 'stipulation,' and we think the right to select the judicial forum is the kind of
'provision' that cannot be waived under § 14 of the Securities Act."), overruled by, Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
90. Id. at 438.
91. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515-17.
92. id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 508.
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arbitration, while striking the domestic agreement as invalid.95 The
Court's deference to the FAA, despite the apparent conflict between
Congressional purposes and objectives of the Securities Exchange Act
showed a departure from Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
In announcing its holding, the Court emphasized that "[a] contrac-
tual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall
be litigated and the law to be applied is . . . an almost indispensable
precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essen-
tial to any international business transaction."96 Stressing the commer-
cial nature of the transaction, Scherk demonstrates the Court's transition
into honoring the FAA with respect to international business relations.97
In his opinion, Justice Stewart counseled reluctance to "a parochial
refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an international arbitra-
tion agreement" that would "damage the fabric of international com-
merce and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen
to enter into international commercial agreements. ' 98 For these reasons,
the Court upheld the parties' contractual agreement to arbitrate their
claims in Paris under Illinois law for any dispute arising out of their
commercial transaction in accord with the provisions of the FAA.99
C. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
In 1985, the Court again determined the validity of an arbitration
clause in an international commercial transaction. 1°° Following Scherk,
the Court held that the antitrust dispute in Mitsubishi v. Soler-Chrysler
Plymouth was subject to arbitration as stipulated in the parties' agree-
ment.101 The dispute entangled several parties: Mitsubishi Motors Cor-
poration, Chrysler International (wholly owned by Chrysler
Corporation), and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries on the petitioner-cross-
respondent side, and Soler Chrysler-Plymouth ("Soler") on the respon-
dent-cross-petitioner side.
10 2
In October 1979, Soler, a Puerto Rico corporation, entered into a
Distributor Agreement with Chrysler International, a Swiss corpora-
tion.10 3 On the same date, Chrysler International, Soler, and Mitsubishi
entered into a Sales Agreement, which made reference to the Distributor
95. Id. at 515-20.
96. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516.
97. See Id.
98. Id. at 516-17.
99. Id. at 519-20.
100. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. 614.
101. Id. at 665-66.
102. Id. at 616-17.
103. Id. at 617.
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Agreement.""° In the Sales Agreement, the parties stipulated to "Arbitra-
tion of Certain Matters."' 1 5 After executing the agreements, Soler began
to experience difficulty meeting its projected sales requirements and
requested that Mitsubishi delay or cancel shipment of several orders.
10 6
Mitsubishi and Chrysler International refused permission for any diver-
sion from the terms stipulated in the contract. 0 7 Unable to come to a
resolution, Mitsubishi eventually withheld shipment of 966 vehicles and
brought an action against Soler in the United States District Court for
the District of Puerto Rico, under the Federal Arbitration Act and the
Convention. Mitsubishi moved to compel arbitration.
10 8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
U.S. District Court should enforce an agreement to resolve antitrust
claims by arbitration when the agreement arose from an international
transaction. 0 9 In analyzing whether the parties agreed to submit their
claims to arbitration, the Court announced that "agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim ... does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum." 110 Furthermore, the Court "must assume that if Con-
gress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given statute to
include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that
intention will be deducible from text or legislative history."'
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that the proper
analysis was two-fold: (1) whether the parties agreed to submit their
claims to arbitration; and (2) whether legal constraints external to the
parties' agreement foreclosed the possibility of arbitration. 1 2 In deter-
mining whether Soler's antitrust claims were arbitrable, the Court relied
on Scherk, and concluded "that concerns of international comity, respect
for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity
to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in
the resolution of disputes" requires the Court to enforce the arbitration
agreement. 113
The Court went on to emphatically express the need to enforce
freely negotiated forum selection clauses in international commercial
disputes, stating that the federal policy toward honoring the FAA
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 617.
107. Id. at 618.
108. Id. at 618-19.
109. Id. at 624.
110. Id. at 628.
111. Id.
112. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628.
113. Id. at 629.
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"applies with special force in the field of international commerce. ' 14
"And so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to
serve both its remedial and deterrent function."
' 1 5
Where the parties have agreed that the arbitral body is to decide a
defined set of claims which includes, as in these cases, those arising
from the application of American antitrust law, the tribunal therefore
should be bound to decide that dispute in accord with the national
law giving rise to the claim.
116
The issue before the Court in Mitsubishi specifically addressed the
validity of a forum selection clause assigning arbitration to Japan. The
Court did not decide whether the dispute would be submitted to arbitra-
tion if the contract had stipulated to a foreign choice of law. In fact, the
Court articulated apprehension to arbitration agreements, which fixed
arbitration in a foreign forum under the application of foreign law.117 In
a controversial footnote, the Court stated: "We merely note that in the
event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem
as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies
for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning
the agreement as against public policy."' 8
Preceding the Court's informative declaration, the Court discussed
the case's record. In doing so, the Court took into account the Sales
Agreement's choice of law provision: "This Agreement is made in, and
will be governed by and construed in all respects according to the laws
of the Swiss Confederation as if entirely performed therein."' 19 As ami-
cus curiae, the United States raised the "possibility that the arbitral panel
will read this provision not simply to govern interpretation of the con-
tract terms, but wholly to displace American law even where it other-
wise would apply."' 20 The International Chamber of Commerce opined
that while the arbitrators could conceivably determine that Soler's
anticompetitive conduct fell within the purview of the choice of law pro-
vision, it was highly unlikely. 2 ' Because Mitsubishi conceded at oral
argument that the U.S. Sherman Act, rather than Swiss law, would gov-
ern the anticompetitive claims, the Supreme Court stated that it had no
reason to speculate, at this stage in the proceeding, the validity of the
114. Id. at 631.
115. Id. at 637.
116. Id. at 636-37 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at n.19.
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arbitration agreement. 22
In a confusing sentence, breeding controversy in circuits across the
nation, Justice Blackmun stated "We therefore have no occasion to spec-
ulate on this matter at this stage in the proceedings, when Mitsubishi
seeks to enforce the agreement to arbitrate, not to enforce the award."'
123
Because this sentence directly follows the review of the record, conclud-
ing that American law would apply to Soler's antitrust claim, a strict
textual reading would lend credence to several courts' interpretation.
Several circuits have interpreted this to mean that had the Court
found Swiss law would apply, then the arbitration agreement would be
void as a prospective waiver of the litigant's rights or the court would
have considered the litigant's choice of law argument. 124 Furthermore, it
can be argued, that Justice Blackmun was simply preserving and
reminding the federal courts of their ability, and duty,12 5 to evaluate an
award obtained in a foreign tribunal, after the foreign tribunal inter-
preted U.S. statutory laws, such as the Sherman Act claim at issue in
Mitsubishi.
Footnote 19 concludes by stating that in the event a contract's
choice of law and forum selection clause operate in tandem to waive a
litigant's right to pursue statutory remedies, then the agreement would
be void as against public policy. 126 Justice Blackmun's choice of the
word agreement, instead of award, strengthens the belief that favorable
choice of law and forum selection clauses are to be condemned when
challenging the agreement, not the enforcement of the award.
D. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV Sky Reefer
In 1995, the Supreme Court decided Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros,
S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, which held that the foreign arbitration agreement
contained in the contract did not lessen liability under the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA"). 127 Petitioners argued that the foreign
arbitration agreement violated section § 3(8) of COGSA because the
inconvenience and cost of proceeding in Tokyo would "lessen liability"
in the sense that COGSA prohibits.' 28 In granting an interlocutory
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 160-61 (7th Cir. 1993) ("By including the
anti-waiver provisions in the securities laws, Congress made clear that the public policy of these
laws should not be thwarted . . . (stating that prospective waivers of statutory antitrust remedies
would likely be voidable as contrary to public policy)"); see also Asignacion, supra note 68, at *8;
see also Dumitru, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
125. Scherk, 417 U.S. at n.5.
126. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at n.19 (emphasis added).
127. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MN Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 530 (1995).
128. Id. at 532.
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appeal, the Court certified the question of whether § 3(8) nullifies an
arbitration clause.
129
While holding that the forum selection clause assigning arbitration
to Japan was valid, the Supreme Court expressed hesitation and ceded to
the concerns in petitioner's choice of law argument. 3 ° Even though the
Court evaded ruling on the issue, it stated that the ambiguity over
whether the foreign tribunal would apply COGSA raised a concern of
substance.1 31 In his opinion, Justice Kennedy argued that the enactment
of § 3(8) was designed to prohibit contracts from relieving "the carrier
of the obligations or diminish the legal duties specified by the Act."
' 132
This, he concluded, advocates hesitation to courts upholding choice of
law provisions if the choice of law lessens the carrier's obligations or
diminishes its legal duties under the Act.
13 3
In evading the question, Justice Kennedy wrote:
Whatever the merits of petitioner's comparative reading of COGSA
and its Japanese counterpart, its claim is premature. At this interlocu-
tory stage it is not established what law the arbitrators will apply to
petitioner's claims or that petitioner will receive diminished protec-
tion as a result.'
34
In combing out the Supreme Court's arbitration precedent, Justice
Kennedy articulated that the district court retained jurisdiction to review
the foreign arbitral award to ensure the legitimate interest of the U.S.
laws had been addressed. 35 However, citing Mitsubishi, Justice Ken-
nedy suggested that the Court should sever the choice of law provision,
should the Court be persuaded that there would be no subsequent oppor-
tunity for review. 
36
Despite the contract's express language that the contract "shall be
governed by... Japanese law,"' 1 37 the Supreme Court affirmed the First
Circuit's determination that the arbitrator (not the court) reserves judg-
ment as to the choice of law to be applied. 38 Furthermore, mere specu-
lation that the arbitrators might apply Japanese law, is not sufficient
itself to nullify an arbitration agreement. 39 However, Justice Kennedy's
opinion leads to the belief that had the Court known that Japanese law
129. Id.
130. Id. at 540-41.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 539.
133. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, SA, 515 U.S. at 539.
134. Id. at 540.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 531.
138. Id. at 541.
139. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A, 515 U.S. at 541.
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would apply, then it would have considered petitioner's choice of law
arguments. Furthermore, the Court seems to stipulate that if Japanese
law lessens or diminished the carrier's liability under the Act (the pur-
pose for which it was enacted-to avoid ships registering under flags of
convenience and escaping liability), the Court would sever the provi-
sion, and compel arbitration under U.S. law.
Justice Stevens' dissent supports the majority's inferences; he
argued that the holding in Vimar "discards settled law and adopts a
novel construction of § 3(8). " 14o In support of his position, he denoted:
In the 19th century it was common practice for shipowners to issue
bills of lading that included stipulations exempting themselves from
liability for losses occasioned by the negligence of their employees.
Because a bill of lading was (and is) a contract of adhesion, which a
shipper must accept or else find another means to transport his goods,
shippers were in no position to bargain around these no-liability
clauses. 141
The dissent postulates that choice of law provisions in bills of lad-
ing are void as a matter of law.142 Because ship owners have historically
evaded ethical business practices, he argued that COGSA's "lessening
liability" clause sought to prohibit ship owners from stipulating to
favorable choices of law. Unfortunately the Supreme Court was not fin-
ished hearing maritime claims and three years later the Court again
determined the validity of an arbitration agreement in a maritime
contract.
E. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp.
In 1998, the Supreme Court issued its opinion Wright v. Universal
Mar. Serv. Corp.143 In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court invali-
dated an agreement to arbitrate a longshoreman's Americans with Disa-
bilities Act ("ADA") claim.'" The longshoreman was a citizen of the
U.S. and a member of International Longshoreman's Association
("LA").14 5 Wright was injured while working for a shipping company
and sought compensation under the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, and ultimately settled his claim for $250,000. 146
Three years later, Wright returned to the ILA seeking employment.
147
140. Id. at 543 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
141. Id. at 543-44.
142. Id.
143. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
144. Id. at 82.
145. Id. at 72.




However, when the stevedore companies realized that Wright had settled
a permanent disability claim, they informed the ILA they would no
longer accept Wright for employment. 48
The LA directed Wright to obtain an attorney and file a claim
under the ADA.'49 After a convoluted litigation background, Wright
filed a suit in the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina against the South Carolina Stevedores Association and 6 indi-
vidual stevedore companies, alleging claims under the ADA.'
The stevedore companies answered and asserted several affirmative
defenses, including failure to exhaust remedies under the CBA.15' After
discovery, the stevedores moved for summary judgment, and the Magis-
trate Judge recommended the case be dismissed "without prejudice
because Wright had failed to pursue the grievance procedure provided
by the CBA."' 52 The District Court adopted the Magistrate's recommen-
dation and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed. 1
53
The Court analyzed Alexander v. Gardner-Denver and Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.154 to determine the case at hand.1
55
There is obviously some tension between these two lines of cases.
Whereas Gardner-Denver stated that "an employee's rights under
Title VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver," Gilmer held that
the right to a federal judicial forum for an ADEA claim could be
waived. 1
56
Despite having the opportunity to determine the validity of union-
negotiated waiver of U.S. statutory rights in collective bargaining agree-
ments, the Court evaded ruling on the issue, again. Stating that it found
"it unnecessary to resolve the question of the validity of a union-negoti-
ated waiver, since it is apparent to us, on the facts and arguments
presented [in Wright], that no such waiver has occurred."' 57
The Court skirted the issue by concluding that Wright's cause of
action arose not out of contract, but out of the ADA.158 Justice Scalia
wrote: "Not only is petitioner's statutory claim not subject to a presump-
tion of arbitrability; we think any CBA requirement to arbitrate [a statu-
148. Id.
149. Wright, 525 U.S. at 74.




154. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
155. Wright, 525 U.S. at 75-77.
156. Id. at 76-77.
157. Id. at 77.
158. Id. at 79.
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tory claim] must be particularly clear."' 5 9 Even though the Court
declared its refusal to rule on the issue, Justice Scalia again brought up
the question left unresolved in Gardner-Denver:
Whether or not Gardner-Denver's seemingly absolute prohibition of
union waiver of employees' federal forum rights survives Gilmer,
Gardner-Denver at least stands for the proposition that the right to a
federal judicial forum is of sufficient importance to be protected
against less-than-explicit union waiver in a CBA.
1 60
There is obvious tension between the Supreme Court's arbitration
precedents regarding union-negotiated collective bargaining agreements.
The Supreme Court has never determined whether union-negotiated
waiver of litigants' U.S. statutory rights is strictly prohibited (as sug-
gested in Gardner-Denver).161 However, the Court has held that waiver
of vindicating the right in a federal forum is valid, so long as waiver is
express (as suggested in Wright and Gilmer). Although the Court has
never held that a union may not negotiate vindication of a U.S. statutory
right under foreign law, the Court has counseled reluctance to the valid-
ity of such waiver in various opinions over the years.
162
F. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams
In 2001, the Supreme Court again considered the validity of an
arbitration agreement in an employment contract in Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams. 163 The question before the Court was whether Section 1
of the FAA exempted all employment disputes from being submitted to
arbitration." 6 In enacting the FAA, Congress included an exceptions
provision in Chapter 1, Section 1 to exempt certain persons from appli-
cation under the Title (see Bautista, discussed supra).1 65 Congress
included the exemption provision for persons whom were believed to
need special protection from abusive employment practices: "but noth-
ing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce."'
166
Circuit City Stores hired Adams as a sales counselor in October
1995.167 His employment contract stipulated to arbitration for any claims
159. Id.
160. Id. at 80.
161. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51.
162. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at n.19; see also Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros,
S.A, 515 U.S. at 543 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
163. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
164. Id. at 109.
165. 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1947).
166. Id.
167. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 110.
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arising out of or related to his employment. 6 ' The Supreme Court was
asked to determine whether Adams fell into the "any other class of
workers" exception in Section 1 of the FAA.169 Delivering the opinion
for the Court, Justice Kennedy wrote:
Construing the residual phrase to exclude all employment contracts
fails to give independent effect to the statute's enumeration of the
specific categories of workers which precedes it; there would be no
need for Congress to use the phrases "seamen" and "railroad employ-
ees" if those same classes of workers were subsumed within the
meaning of the "engaged in ... commerce" residual clause.' 7o
The Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Sec-
tion 1, which would have included Adams as a protected class was
unsubstantiated.17 After a detailed analysis, the Court held that Con-
gress intended to protect only transportation workers.' 72 Relying on
Congress's use of "seamen" and "railroad employees," the Court specu-
lated that if Congress intended to protect all employees involved in com-
merce, it would have explicitly expressed such intent.'73
G. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett
More recently, the Supreme Court issued its contentious opinion
regarding the ability of unions to negotiate arbitration clauses into col-
lective bargaining agreements of employees.' 74 In a 5-4 opinion, Justice
Thomas delivered the opinion for the Court in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v.
Pyett.17 5 The case arose out of the Second Circuit, with the Supreme
Court reversing both the District Court and Court of Appeals'
opinions. 176
Respondents were members of the Service Employees International
Union ("SEIU"), consisting of building carpenters, porters, and doorper-
sons in New York City. '177 The SEIU and the Realty Advisory Board of
Labor Relations, Inc. ("RAB") negotiated industry wide CBA's for
employees and the real-estate industry.' 78 Encompassed in the CBA was
a provision agreeing to submit all employment discrimination claims to
arbitration, including claims brought under the Age Discrimination in
168. Id. at 109-10.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 114.
171. Id. at 110-11.
172. Id. at 119.
173. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 119.
174. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
175. Id. at 250.
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Employment Act ("ADEA").179
While arbitration was pending, respondents withdrew their ADEA
claims, and filed their claims in the Southern District of New York. 180
Petitioners moved to compel arbitration, and the district court denied the
motion because "under Second Circuit precedent, 'even a clear and
unmistakable union-negotiated waiver of a right to litigate certain fed-
eral and state statutory claims in a judicial forum is unenforceable.' 181
Petitioners appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 82 The
Court of Appeals determined that it could not "compel arbitration of the
dispute because Gardner-Denver, which 'remains good law,' held 'that
a collective bargaining agreement could not waive covered workers'
rights to a judicial forum for causes of action created by Congress.' "1
83
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether a provision in
a CBA, which clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbi-
trate ADEA claims was enforceable as a matter of law.
184
Central to the Court's analysis was whether Congress intended "the
substantive protection afforded by the ADEA to include protection
against waiver of the right to a judicial forum."1 85 The Supreme Court
determined that there was no evidence in the text or legislative history
that "'Congress, in enacting the ADEA, intended to preclude arbitration.
of claims under the Act.' "186 The majority, led by Justice Thomas,
declared that Gardner-Denver was not controlling precedent to 14 Penn
Plaza: "First, the Court in Gardner-Denver erroneously assumed that an
agreement to submit statutory discrimination claims to arbitration was
tantamount to a waiver of those rights."
1 87
In holding that statutory discrimination claims could be submitted
to arbitration, Justice Thomas gave credence to the lower court's conclu-
sion that federal antidiscrimination rights "may not be prospectively
waived." '188 Clarifying the difference, Justice Thomas stated that the
lower court "confused an agreement to arbitrate those statutory claims
with a prospective waiver of the substantive right."189 Quoting Mitsub-
ishi, the Court reiterated "'by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only
179. Id. at 252.
180. 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 253.
181. Id. at 254.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 251.
185. Id. at 258.
186. 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 258.





submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than judicial, forum.' 9 190
Referencing Circuit City Stores, the majority proffered that "this
'Court has been quite specific in holding that arbitration agreements can
be enforced under the FAA without contravening the policies of con-
gressional enactments giving employees specific protection against dis-
crimination prohibited by federal law.' "91 The Court differentiated
Gardner-Denver by arguing, "the decision [in Gardner-Denver] to arbi-
trate statutory discrimination claims was tantamount to a substantive
waiver of those rights . . . .""' Justice Thomas alluded that Gardner-
Denver was a "direct descendant" of the Court's decision in Wilko,
which was characterized as "'pervaded by .. . the old judicial hostility
to arbitration. '"193 However, the Court never explicitly held that a
favorable choice of law, which would waive or depreciate a litigant's
U.S. statutory rights are void per se; rather, the Court held that it was
willing to compel arbitration of these rights to a foreign forum.
The Court briefly addressed respondents' argument that the CBA
operated as a substantive waiver of litigants' ADEA rights, but con-
cluded that the question was not properly before the Court.194 Although,
Justice Thomas echoed the language of Mitsubishi's Footnote 19, avow-
ing, "a substantive waiver of federally protected civil rights will not be
upheld," the Court refused to rule that union-negotiated wavier of such
rights are inexcusably void.
195
In a four-person dissent, Justice Souter criticized the majority's
holding.196 Disagreeing with the Court's deduction, Justice Souter
argued that the holding announced in 14 Penn Plaza was in conflict with
the Court's prior precedent.197 Analogizing the rights conferred by Title
VII, at issue in Gardner-Denver, to the individual rights conferred by
the ADEA in 14 Penn Plaza, Justice Souter argued that Gardner-Denver
was controlling precedent.
198
Although Title VII, like the ADEA, "does not speak expressly to the
relationship between federal courts and the grievance-arbitration
machinery of collective-bargaining agreements," we unanimously
held that "the rights conferred" by Title VII... cannot be waived as
"part of the collective bargaining process."1 99
190. Id. at 266.
191. Id.
192. 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 266.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 273-74.
195. Id. at 273.
196. Id. at 274.
197. Id.
198. 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 278.
199. Id. at 278.
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Thus, Justice Souter concluded, "as the Court previously realized,
Gardner-Denver imposed a 'seemingly absolute prohibition of union
waiver of employees' federal forum rights."2' Justice Souter con-
tended that "only a contractual right under the CBA to be free from
discrimination, not the 'independent statutory rights accorded by Con-
gress'" is subject to waiver.2 °1
In a convincing breakdown, the dissent characterized arbitrable
claims from nonarbitrable Claims. Discrimination claims arising from a
breach of a collective bargaining agreement can reasonably be negoti-
ated to submission in arbitration. Logically, two parties conferring rights
in a contract also have the power to dictate how breach of those rights
will be resolved. However, claims arising from a federal statute have
less flexibility in their resolution. When Congress has enacted a statute,
designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual
workers, unions are arguably prohibited from negotiating these rights
out of the vested federal forum. 20 2 Certainly, unions cannot deprive a
litigant of those rights altogether by stipulating to a favorable choice of
law, as in Lindo.
The dissent takes issue with the majority's pass-the-buck mentality.
The majority claimed that "judicial policy concerns," regarding individ-
ual antidiscrimination rights is insufficient in itself to prevent unions
from negotiating arbitration provisions into CBA's absent clear prohibi-
tion by Congress.20 3 Justice Souter, joined by three other Justices dis-
senting, persuasively argued that Congress understood Gardner-Denver
the way the Court has "repeatedly explained it and [Congress] has oper-
ated on the assumption that a CBA cannot waive employees' rights to a
judicial forum to enforce antidiscrimination statutes. ' 2°
Alerting the Court's attention to House Report No. 104-40 (II), dis-
cussing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Justice Souter demonstrates not
only was Congress afforded 30 years to correct the Supreme Court's
decision in Gardner-Denver, Congress has emphatically embraced the
Court's decision.20 5
The Committee emphasizes, however, that the use of alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanisms is intended to supplement, not supplant,
the remedies provided by Title VII. Thus, for example, the Commit-
tee believes that any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitra-
200. Id. at 279.
201. Id.
202. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at n.19.
203. 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 270.
204. Id. at 285.




tion, whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in
an employment contract, does not preclude the affected person from
seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII. This
view is consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title
VII in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).206
The Supreme Court's mentality toward arbitration has developed
from a resistant temperament to a generalized acceptance. A historical
glance of the Court's cases demonstrates the United States' growing
comity toward international affairs and decision to honor the Country's
involvement in the FAA. However, the Court has become over-inclusive
in its approach. Recently, the federal courts' decisions have substantially
altered individual rights; rights afforded by Congress to protect certain
classes of persons. Furthermore, the judgments have produced confusion
for federal courts across the country. This confusion has led to a particu-
larly unusual and incoherent course by the Eleventh Circuit in interpret-
ing the validity of arbitration clauses in seamen contracts.
IV. LiNDo v. NCL (BAHAMAS), LTD.
As discussed infra, Lindo's employment contract ("Contract") with
Norwegian Cruise Line ("NCL") was governed by a collective bargain-
ing agreement, negotiated between the Norwegian Seafarers' Union and
NCL.2 °7 Paragraph 12 of the agreement specified that all Jones Act
claims were to be resolved by arbitration in accordance with the United
Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards ("the New York Convention" or "Convention").
20 8
The Contract stipulated to arbitration in the seaman's country of
citizenship, or in the alternative, Nassau, Bahamas.2 0 9 The choice of law
provision postulated to the law of the flag under which the vessel was
flown. In this instance, the arbitrators were to apply Bahamian law.210
Lindo argued that the choice of law and forum selection clause operated
in tandem to waive his U.S. statutory Jones Act claims.2"1 Thus, Lindo
challenged the application of Bahamian law, relying on the Circuit's
precedent in Thomas.
In a 92-page opinion, the Eleventh Circuit meandered through the
Circuit's and Supreme Court's arbitration precedent to determine that
Lindo's Jones Act claims were not prospectively waived. To reach this
206. Id. at n.6.
207. Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1260.
208. Id. at 1260-61.
209. Id. at 1261.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1262.
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conclusion, the Court had to evade the law laid down in Thomas.212
However, rather than overrule Thomas, the Court communicated that
Thomas merely misinterpreted Mitsubishi's Footnote 19 and the pro-
spective waiver doctrine.213 Specifically, the Court held that the pro-
spective waiver doctrine was to be invoked when a litigant sought to
challenge an award, not the agreement.21 4 Judge Hull shocked the Cir-
cuit when he announced that an employment CBA, containing a choice
of law provision and forum selection clause, could be compelled to arbi-
tration, even though the employee's individual rights, afforded by Con-
gress, were substantially altered.
Under Judge Hull's interpretation, a litigant may only challenge an
arbitration agreement (under the defenses available under Article II) if:
(1) it is void under an internationally recognized defense such as duress,
mistake, fraud, or waiver; or (2) it contravenes fundamental policies of
the forum state.21 5 Conversely, the Circuit held that Article V of the
FAA, which Lindo tried to invoke, could only be applied at the enforce-
ment of an award, not to challenge the agreement.21 6 Despite the hold-
ing's conflict with the Supreme Court's suggestive dicta in Gardner-
Denver, Mitsubishi, and 14 Penn Plaza, the Eleventh Circuit deviated
from its guided path and stripped seamen of their rights and access to
U.S. federal courts.
The Circuit first confronted an arbitration provision and its inter-
play with the FAA in a seaman's contract in Bautista v. Star Cruises.21 7
The 2005 Eleventh Circuit decision analyzed an arbitration provision
contained in a CBA negotiated between the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration ("POEA") and Star Cruises. 1 8 Bautista
challenged the agreement under Florida law, charging that the agreement
was unconscionable, with which the court disagreed. 219 Additionally, the
seaman argued, the exemption provision in Section 1 of the FAA prohib-
ited POEA from negotiating an arbitration provision into the CBA.22° In
a confusing analysis delivered by the Eleventh Circuit, Bautista pro-
fessed that the seamen exemption in Chapter 1 of the FAA did not apply
to arbitration agreements involving foreign parties under Chapter 2.221
The Court held that Chapter 1 of the FAA was only applicable to
212. Id. at 1277-80.
213. Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1277-80.
214. Id.
215. Id. at n.18.
216. Id. at 1277-80.
217. Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1289.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1301.




domestic collective bargaining agreements involving domestic par-
ties. 2 Arguing that Chapter 2 of the FAA (adopted to recognize the
U.S.'s participation in the Convention and apply to international dis-
putes) was not incorporated under Title 9 to include Chapter 1.223 Bau-
tista essentially held that Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of the FAA are
exclusive of each other, and as such, the foreign seaman's CBA fell
under Chapter 2. Therefore, the exceptions provision in Chapter 1,
exempting seamen from arbitration under Title 9, does not apply.
Despite the Circuit's holding in Bautista, the Eleventh Circuit devi-
ated from Bautista in Thomas. In a novel opinion by Judge Barkett, the
savvy judge held that the Supreme Court's footnote in Mitsubishi was
indicative of the FAA's application in Thomas.22 4 The opinion held that
the forum selection clause and choice of law provision prospectively
waived Thomas's U.S. statutory rights and was therefore void as against
public policy.2 2 5 Under the direction of Footnote 19, the Circuit refused
to compel arbitration of the seaman's claim to a foreign nation under
foreign law because it waived the litigant's Seaman's Wage Act
claim.226
Four years later, the Circuit revisited Thomas, and Lindo's holding
shocked the Circuit when it announced that Judge Barkett had misinter-
preted Article V and Footnote 19. Judge Hull determined that Article
V's public policy defense was only applicable when challenging an
award obtained in a foreign tribunal. 2 7 Thus, the court refused to sever
the choice of law provision and the seaman was required to litigate his
claims in a foreign tribunal under foreign law. He could then come back
and challenge the award as against public policy. The court's reinterpre-
tation substantially altered the accessibility of foreign seamen to domes-
tic courts and deviated from the Supreme Court's historic precedent in
Lauritzen v. Larsen228 and Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis.229 The hold-
ing ignores the well-established principles laid down by the Supreme
Court and allows domestic corporations to evade domestic laws and
abuse foreign crewmembers without recompense, equivalent to modem-
day slavery.
222. Id. at 1291-00.
223. Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1291-00.
224. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1120-21.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1124.
227. Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1266-68.
228. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
229. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 398 U.S. 306.
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V. THE JONES ACT, THE FAA, AND THE FUTURE
A. History Surrounding the Jones Act and its Applicability to
Foreign Seamen
The Supreme Court was asked to determine the applicability of the
Jones Act in Lauritzen v. Larsen in 1953.30 A Danish employer
employed Larsen, a Danish seaman, to work upon the Randa, a ship of
Danish flag and registry. 231 Larsen signed a contract written in Danish,
which stipulated that the rights of crewmembers would be governed by
Danish law. 32 The contract was negotiated between the ship owner and
the Danish Seamen's Union. 33
Larsen was injured on the vessel and brought a lawsuit in the
Southern District of New York, alleging Jones Act negligence claims.234
Larsen did not deny that Danish law was applicable in his case; rather,
he argued that he should be able to choose between American and Dan-
ish law to apply to his negligence claims.2 35 Justice Jackson analyzed the
Jones Act legislative history to aid his determination of whether to
extend the protections of the Jones Act to foreign crewmembers on for-
eign vessels.236
The Jones Act, enacted in the 1920s, which was "set forth in Title
46 of the United States Code, 46 U.S.C.A., comprise a patchwork of
separate enactments, some tracing far back in our history and many
designed for particular emergencies. 237 Justice Jackson wrote, some
provisions of the Title were specifically addressed to foreign shipping,
and others were confined to American shipping.2 38 However, many of
the provisions failed to specify.239 Because Congress failed to clarify
some of the provisions' application, Justice Jackson concluded that their
application was to be judicially determined from context and
circumstance.240
The Court recognized that because the cause of action for tort had
substantial ties with both Denmark and the United States, the Court
would look at several factors "generally conceded to influence choice of
230. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. 571.




235. Id. at 576.
236. Id. at 577.






law to govern a tort claim, particularly a maritime tort claim."24 The
seven weighing factors were: (1) the place of the wrongful act; (2) the
law of the flag; (3) the allegiance or domicile of the injured seaman; (4)
the allegiance of the defendant ship owner; (5) the place where the con-
tract of employment was made; (6) the inaccessibility of a foreign
forum; and (7) the law of the forum.
2 42
Ultimately the Court held that the seven above-stated factors
weighed heavily in favor of the application of Danish law.243 However,
in delivering its opinion, the Court held, inter alia, that all seamen,
including foreign seamen, are afforded protection under the Jones
Act.244
In 1970, the Court revisited the applicability of the Jones Act to
foreign seaman in Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis.245 In refusing to over-
rule Lauritzen, Justice Douglas wrote:
We see no reason whatsoever to give the Jones Act a strained con-
struction so that this alien owner, engaged in an extensive business
operation in this country, may have an advantage over citizens
engaged in the same business by allowing him to escape the obliga-
tions and responsibility of a Jones Act "employer." The flag, the
nationality of the seaman, the fact that his employment contract was
Greek, and that he might be compensated there are in the totality of
the circumstances of this case minor weights in the scales compared
with the substantial and continuing contacts that this alien owner has
with this country.246
Justice Douglas argued that Lauritzen was decided based on the
specific facts of the case.24 7 Furthermore, he referenced the Court's
"allusion to the practice of American owners of finding a 'convenient'
flag 'to avoid stringent shipping laws by seeking foreign registration
eagerly offered by some countries.'- 248 However, despite Justice Doug-
las' credence to the concerns of the trade, he held that because the Greek
crew member was adequately protected under Greek law, he could be
subject to Greek law as stipulated in the contract.249
In a brief on behalf of the National Maritime Union of America
("NMUA"), as amicus curiae in Hellenic Lines Ltd., the NMUA argued
that the faqade of a foreign flag makes it "cheaper to operate beyond the
241. Id. at 583.
242. Id. at 583-91.
243. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 592-93.
244. See generally id.
245. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 398 U.S. 306.
246. Id. at 310.
247. Id. at 315.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 318.
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pale of American laws, and, thus, it makes for easier competition against
American-flag vessels in the quest for the American dollar," yet free of
American obligation.25° The NMUA urged that because the ship owner
in Hellenic Lines Ltd. had its main office in the United States, from
which all management and business operations took place therefrom, the
corporation should be required to abide by the laws of the Country.25'
Furthermore, the amicus curiae argued that the vessel obtained substan-
tial revenue from its operation in the U.S.252
In directing the Court's attention to the legislative history behind
the Jones Act, NMUA highlighted:
It is a shocking fact that, as of 1969, vessels flying the American flag
carried only six per cent of our total imports and exports. The Jones
Act, as well as the prior Seamen's Act which it amended were
intended by Congress to reduce the competitive advantage of foreign-
flag operators seeking American business. As it is Constitutionally
empowered, Congress has recognized that detriment to the American
economy by weighted foreign competition is an effect going far
beyond the "internal affairs" of a foreign vessel. Congress has
refused to permit the American maritime industry to be so handi-
capped in the face of growing foreign competition. The result was a
direct benefit to foreign seamen as well as to the American
economy.
2 53
Citing Judge Friendly in Monteiro v. Sociedad Maritima San Nico-
las, S. A., the MNUA argued the legislative history supported the idea
that the Jones Act was thought "to apply to foreign vessels touching at
American ports," because application of such would "tend to 'equalize
the cost of operation' of American and foreign flag vessels and thereby
discourage American shipowners from placing their vessels under for-
eign flags. 254 Preventing American registration of foreign flags of con-
venience "could be better attained by giving foreign seamen
unobstructed and mandatory access to the federal courts rather than by
leaving it to the discretion of each district judge to remit the seaman to a
foreign consul, who could hardly be counted upon to apply the special
remedies . "..."255
The Honorable Judge Learned Hand even had the opportunity to
250. Br. on Behalf of National Maritime Union of America, as amicus curiae, Hellenic Lines
Limited v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 1970 WL 136482.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. (emphasis added).
254. Id. (citing Monteiro v. Sociedad Maritima San Nicolas, S. A., 280 F.2d 568, 573 (2d Cir.
1960); see particularly H.R. REP. No. 645, at 8 (1912); H.R. RaP. No. 852, at 19 (1914); and the
remarks of Senator Fletcher, 50 Cong. Rec. 5748-49 (1915)).
255. Monteiro, 280 F.2d at 574 (emphasis added).
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voice an opinion on the applicability of the Jones Act to foreign seamen,
stating:
The Jones Act was the culmination of a series of efforts, largely those
of the Seamen's Union, to secure more adequate relief for American
seamen, injured in their employment. It is extremely unlikely that
Congress should have meant to exclude aliens who, in every sense
that mattered, were members of that class merely because they had
not been naturalized. Naturalization is a troublesome process for a
seaman; he is sure to be absent from the country for long periods
which are indeed apt to be longer than those during which he is
here.... To hold that these are excepted from [the Act's] protection
because they have not become naturalized, would, it seems to us,
pretty clearly defeat the overriding purpose of Congress.256
Judge L. Hand wrote the opinion in Gambera v. Bergoty in 1942.
However, even after 20 years, the Southern District of New York rein-
vigorated his attitude in Voyiatzis v. Nat'l Shipping & Trading Corp.257
The Court stated:
It is our belief that in any case where substantial contacts [with the
U.S.] exist and the Jones Act therefore applicable, it will be applied
notwithstanding a provision for exclusive foreign jurisdiction. To
enforce such agreements would run counter to the clearly expressed
policy applicable to shipowners who are subject to the Jones Act.
That policy is set out in the Federal Employers' Liability Act (incor-
porated into the Jones Act by reference) as follows: 'Any contract,
rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which
shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any lia-
bility created by this chapter, shall to that extent be void.' 45
U.S.C.A. § 55.258
Courts have historically applauded the reach of the Jones Act to
include protection over foreign seamen. This protection was exception-
ally praised when judges actively sought to protect seamen from defiant
trade practices. Unfortunately, the practice of American ship owners
registering ships to foreign flags of convenience is not a foreign trick of
the trade and is continually practiced today.259
B. "American" Cruise Lines
There are various reasons cruise companies have traditionally
256. Gambera v. Bergoty, 132 F.2d 414, 416 (2d Cir. 1942).
257. Voyiatzis v. Nat'l Shipping & Trading Corp., 199 F. Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
258. Id. at 925.
259. Justin Samuel Wales, Beyond the Sail: The Eleventh Circuit's Thomas Decision and Its
Ineffectual Impact on the Life, Work, and Legal Realities of the Cruise Industry's Foreign
Employees, 65 U. MiAMi L. REV. 1215, 1221 (2011) (The majority of cruise ships, around sixty
percent, are registered in Panama, The Bahamas, or Liberia.).
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sought incorporation and registration in foreign lands.260 Among them
are: lackadaisical labor laws, evasion of federal environmental and
safety standards, avoidance of U.S. taxation liabilities, etc. 261 The ability
to register under flags of convenience allows major cruise line compa-
nies to evade the laws and regulations of the U.S., even though the
majority of cruise line passengers deport from North America every
year. 262
The Supreme Court's pro-arbitration stance and its adherence to the
FAA adulterated the country's precedent of the Jones Act. The country's
outlook on arbitration, while important to international affairs, has
deprived individuals of important rights. Over the years, Congress has
enacted numerous laws to protect the rights of individuals. Some of the
Acts were at the heart of debate in Gardner-Denver, Wright, and 14
Penn Plaza.26 3 Congress enacts legislation to protect certain classes.
Members of classes and unions, which are historically deprived of ade-
quate representation and in need of protection from abusive employment
practices. Of these, Congress enacted the ADA, ADEA, Title VII, Title
IX, Jones Act, etc. The aim of Congress in enacting this legislation is to
afford abused class members with individualized rights. Rights pre-
scribed by statute and codified into law.
The claims afforded in Congressional acts, especially those aimed
at employment, are designed to keep industries accountable. In this
instance, it was the shipping and maritime industry. The early Congress
of the 1920s found seamen to be included as a class in need of protec-
tion.26 4 Recognizing that ship owners were registering their ships to for-
eign flags and incorporating their companies under foreign countries,
Congress realized that ship owners were selecting favorable choice of
laws to evade U.S. statutory requirements. 65
The ability to stipulate to a favorable choice of law and forum
allows industries to tailor their employment contracts to lessen or dimin-
ish individual rights. The Court's pro-arbitration stance has effectively
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Fla. Caribbean Cruise Ass'n., Cruise Industry Overview (2011), available at http://www.
f-cca.com/downloads/201 1 -overview-bookCruise%20Industry%200verview%20and%2OStatis
tics.pdf (finding that "In 2010 a record of 15 million passengers are forecasted to have cruised,
with 11.1 million originating in North America.").
263. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 1015 (determining whether Title VII claims under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 could be compelled to arbitration; see also Wright, 525 U.S. at 72
(determining whether claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") could be
compelled to arbitration); 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 251 (determining whether claims
brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") could be compelled to
arbitration).
264. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 579.
265. Resp't Br., supra note 32, at *15.
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endorsed this practice, making it easier for companies to abuse employ-
ees and negotiate arbitration provisions with unfavorable law.
Lindo's holding depicts this practice. Norwegian Cruise Line, a
Bermuda corporation, with its principal place of business in Miami,
Florida, stipulated to the application of Bahamian law. The application
of Bahamian law would infer that Lindo could not bring his Jones Act
negligence claims, but instead is required to litigate his negligence
claims under a comparable Bahamian law.266 The Eleventh Circuit held
that because Lindo could litigate his negligence claims in a Nicaraguan
tribunal, under Bahamian negligence laws, the court was not prospec-
tively waiving the litigant's rights by compelling arbitration.267
The court went on to hold that the "void as against public policy"
defense is only applicable when a litigant seeks to challenge an
award.2 68 However, Thomas explicitly held that waiver of statutory
rights by union negotiated contractual agreement could be declared void
when defendant sought to compel arbitration. 269 Because stipulating to a
favorable choice of law could effectively result in no award, Judge Bar-
kett cautioned the court against compelling arbitration to a foreign forum
under the application of foreign law. When arbitration of claims could
result in no award-"a distinct possibility given the U.S. based nature of
his claim"-the litigant will have nothing to review in federal courts.
270
This being the case, Judge Barkett held that the forum selection clause
and choice of law acted in tandem to waive Thomas's U.S. statutory
rights.
C. The Eleventh Circuit Ignores the Nature of the Claims
At issue in Mitsubishi was the Sherman Act,2 7 ' which was enacted
to support competition in the marketplace. The Sherman Act prohibited
certain business activities that would interfere with fair trade and crea-
tion of monopolies. 72 Unlike Lindo, Mitsubishi did not deal with indi-
vidual rights arising out of tort. The securities claims at issue in
Mitsubishi did not deal with personal injuries affecting a person's life
and well-being. The result of compelling arbitration in Mitsubishi might
have resulted in delay of review by a United States court or possible
delay in receiving a monetary award. However, the delay in a case like
Lindo could advance harm to a victim. Unlike securities fraud and anti-
266. Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1283.
267. Id. at 1277-80.
268. Id. at 1280-82.
269. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1120-24.
270. Id. at 1124.
271. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. (2004).
272. Richard Squire, Antitrust and the Supremacy Clause, 59 STAN. L. REv. 77, 77 (2006).
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competition claims, tort claims could result in delay of medical aid to a
victim.
General maritime law affords seamen a right to prompt and ade-
quate medical treatment in a claim for maintenance and cure. 273 Com-
pelling arbitration of maintenance and cure claims could mean delay for
the seaman seeking medical treatment. Delay in medical treatment is
known to aggravate preexisting conditions. When Congress has gone
through the laborious task of drafting and passing legislation to protect
certain members, its justification for passing new legislation is substanti-
ated on facts showing disparate treatment of the favored class. Congress
is not at whim, and certainly would not have the time to enact legislation
absent lobbying and movement efforts on behalf of the represented
class.
D. Abusive Business Practices by the Maritime Industry is
Not Ancient History
Recently a grassroots organization, International Cruise Victims,
Inc., passed legislation to protect cruise ship passengers injured at sea.
The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act, which passed in 2010, was
enacted by Congress after testimony by rape victims and family mem-
bers distressed by loved ones who had disappeared at sea.274 The small
organization rallied itself through Congress, fighting off corporate cruise
lines, and passed the Act under Title 46 (the same Title housing the
Jones Act). The organization allied itself with other nonprofit organiza-
tions and sought Congressional protection for United States passengers
at sea.
It is through the effort and compassion of small organizations that
Congress begins to act and generate laws. It can hardly be inferred that
once Congress has acted to grant protections to certain class members,
that companies can contractually negotiate with unions around those
afforded rights. By stipulating to a foreign law, employers are able to
lessen or deprive the class member of the protections afforded by
Congress.
E. The Direction of the Supreme Court and Congress on
Union-Negotiated Waiver
The Supreme Court has refused to rule on whether union-negoti-
ated contracts, which stipulate to the application of foreign law are inde-
fensibly void. The Court has however counseled hesitation in
273. See generally Calmar S. S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938).
274. Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 3507 (2010).
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compelling arbitration under foreign law when it would waive the liti-
gant's U.S. statutory rights, known as prospective waiver.275
Justice Souter's dissent in 14 Penn Plaza best articulates the
Supreme Court's opinion on union-negotiated collective bargaining
agreements and the prospective waiver doctrine.2 76 Arguing that the
Court got it right in Gardner-Denver, Justice Souter described the Con-
gressional adherence to the principle that statutory rights afforded by
Congress could not be waived as part of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.2 77 Specifically, if Congress intended to disturb the principle that
union-negotiated waivers are void, then it would have expressed its
deviation from Gardner-Denver in its enacted legislation that fol-
lowed.278 However, instead of deviating from the Court's principle, Jus-
tice Souter argues that Congress emphatically embraced the Court's
holding that union-negotiated waivers are void.279
Even when the Court had the opportunity to rule on the issue, the
Court has always determined that the validity of union-negotiated
waiver is not properly before the Court. However, Congress apparently
has been watching the Supreme Court and lower courts' interpretation of
the FAA and its interplay with employment contracts. There is some
support that Congress is unhappy with the courts' determination that
unions are allowed to freely negotiate unfavorable arbitration agree-
ments.2 80 In a proposed amendment to the FAA, the Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2011 would amend Title 9 to remove its applicability to employ-
ment disputes, consumer disputes, and civil rights disputes.28'
Within the proposed amendments, Congress stated the following
findings:
(1) The Federal Arbitration Act (now enacted as chapter 1 of title 9 of
the United States Code) was intended to apply to disputes between
commercial entities of generally similar sophistication and bargaining
power.
(2) A series of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States
have changed the meaning of the Act so that it now extends to con-
sumer disputes and employment disputes.
(3) Most consumers and employees have little or no meaningful
choice whether to submit their claims to arbitration. Often, consum-
ers and employees are not even aware that they have given up their
rights.
275. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. 614, n.19.
276. 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 274-86.
277. Id. at 279.
278. Id. at 285.
279. Id.
280. S. 987, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
281. Id.
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(4) Mandatory arbitration undermines the development of public law
because there is inadequate transparency and inadequate judicial
review of arbitrators' decisions.
(5) Arbitration can be an acceptable alternative when consent to the
arbitration is truly voluntary, and occurs after the dispute arises.282
The proposed amendments suggest that Congress recognizes the
severe disadvantage the provisions of the FAA have placed on employ-
ees and consumers. The disparity in bargaining power between unions
and industries has made employees susceptible to unfair contractual
agreements. The notion that employees have the ability, knowledge, and
resources to effectively negotiate employment contracts is a legal fic-
tion. Quite contrarily, Congress has often determined that employers and
employees are placed on unequal bargaining platforms and has enacted
legislation to protect the individual class members.
F. Fictions of the Federal Arbitration Act
There are several fictions of the FAA. The first being that Con-
gress, in ratifying Chapter 2, did not intend to incorporate Chapter 1 into
its ratification. The Eleventh Circuit held in Bautista that Chapter l's
exemption provision was inapplicable to Chapter 2 when it compelled
arbitration of a Filipino crew member.283 The Circuit determined that the
seamen exemption provision in Chapter 1 was inapplicable because it
only applied to domestic disputes and was not ratified as part of the
Treaty.2 84 Because Bautista involved foreign parties, the Circuit refused
to apply the exemption provision.
However, Chapter 2 was incorporated into Title 9 of the United
States Code. It is reasonable to infer that Congress intended for the pro-
vision in Chapter 1 to apply equally to Chapter 2. Additionally, Section
1 of Chapter 1 states: "'Maritime transactions' and 'commerce' defined;
exceptions to operation of title. 285 If Congress intended for Section 1 of
Chapter 1 to be inapplicable to Chapter 2, then it would have amended
Chapter 1 to reflect its intent. Meaning, Congress would have changed
the word "Title" in Section 1 to read "Chapter." Because Congress did
not amend the language of Section 1, it is reasonable to infer that the
exception provision contained in Chapter 1 intended to apply to all sec-
tions of the Title, including Chapter 2.
This conclusion is supported by Congress's findings in the pro-
282. Id.
283. Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1296.
284. Id.
285. 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1947) (emphasis added).
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posed amendments of the Arbitration Fairness Act.286 Furthermore, the
House Report discussing the Treaty's ratification produces evidence that
Congress intended Chapter 1 to apply to all chapters of Title 9:
THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 208 [CHAPTER 2] IS TO MAKE
THE PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
APPLICABLE TO ACTIONS BROUGHT UNDER THE CONVEN-
TION TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH PROVISIONS ARE NOT
IN CONFLICT WITH THE IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION OR
THE CONVENTION AS RATIFIED BY THE UNITED
STATES.287
"The convention as ratified by the United States" would include
Chapter 1, and the seamen, railroad employees, and transportation work-
ers exemption. Therefore, the class of persons exempt in Chapter 1
would be exempt from the entire Title.
Despite the inherent unequal bargaining power, courts have been
overly supportive of the United States participation in the Convention.
Even at the sacrifice of consumers and employees, courts have com-
pelled arbitration. Despite the Supreme Court's guidance in dicta
throughout the years, Lindo portrays the outcome of the United States'
participation in the Convention. However, this comity to international
affairs intended to apply only to commercial disputes.
Congress assumed that courts analyzing arbitration agreements
would take into consideration the litigants' bargaining power. Under
Mitsubishi, even when the litigant was a sophisticated party, the Court
heavily scrutinized arbitration agreements that waive U.S. statutory
rights.288 At one point the Court even seemed to opine that union-negoti-
ated waiver of a U.S. statutory right is presumptively void. 89 However,
the Court's precedent following Gardner-Denver held that unions were
at liberty to waive the right to vindicate U.S. claims in a federal-judicial
forum, provided the waiver is stated expressly in the contract. 290 How-
ever, even when the litigant's rights were waived to an alternative
forum, the Court hesitated to compel arbitration if the agreement sub-
stantively altered the law applied.
Arriving at 14 Penn Plaza, the Court's stance on union-negotiated
waiver seems to have confused even the Court. With a 5-person majority
and 4-person dissent, it appears that the Court will compel arbitration so
long as it does not prospectively waive the litigant's rights. However,
what amounts to "prospective waiver" is inherently unclear by the
286. S. 987, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
287. H. REP. No. 91-1181, at 3 (1970), 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601, at 3604.
288. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. 614.
289. 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 279.
290. Wright, 525 U.S. at 79.
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Court's precedent as indicated by the 5-person majority and 4-person
dissent. Although, under the Court's current rationale, Lindo's arbitra-
tion agreement, stipulating to resolution in Nicaragua, under Bahamian
law, would appear to constitute a substantive waiver because it failed to
place resolution of his statutory rights in an alternative forum. Instead, it
deprived him of his rights altogether.
G. Advocation of Future Direction
While forum selection clauses should not be presumptively void,
choice of law clauses, which remove liability under certain Congres-
sional acts, should be declared void. Forum selection clauses stipulating
to an alternative forum simply places vindication of rights in a foreign
forum. While there are some procedural hurdles to vindication, the rights
afforded by Congress will still be available to the litigant. Choice of law
clauses on the other hand, may substantively alter the law and deprive
litigants of individualized rights proscribed to them as a member of a
protected class. Such substantive waiver should be void as against public
policy.
Severing and voiding choice of law provisions is especially impor-
tant to employees and consumers. Employees and consumers stand at
the peril of corporate companies. When the sustainability of the eco-
nomic market is in jeopardy, the bargaining power of employees is sub-
stantially depreciated. The employee, desperately seeking employment,
is willing to sign almost anything presented. This can hardly amount to
knowing, willing, and intelligent waiver on behalf of the employee.
In addition to the fiction that Chapter 1 does not apply to Chapter 2,
the FAA is fictionalized in that litigants will have an opportunity to
challenge an award. As stated in Thomas, there is a distinct possibility
that the litigant will return home with no award. 291 Furthermore, com-
pelling arbitration under foreign law may make obtaining an attorney
impracticable, especially if the arbitration is to occur in Nicaragua under
Bahamian law as in Lindo. Because Congress sought to afford seamen
(domestic and foreign) protection under the Jones Act, Lindo's holding
deprives the Act of its intent and purpose.
Not that all choice of law provisions are void for failure to stipulate
to U.S. law. Such a xenophobic holding would certainly be in conflict
with ratification of the treaty and the purpose of the FAA. In ratifying
the New York Convention, Congress sought to increase comity to inter-
national affairs in a globalized economy. Recognition and participation
in the Convention meant that companies negotiating in trade could not
291. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1123.
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disavow their obligations when they agreed to litigate under foreign law.
Large companies with sophisticated attorneys were expected to negotiate
at a caliber that would hold them accountable for their decisions, even if
the decisions deprived them of protection under U.S. laws. However,
employee and consumer contracts are incomparable to the commercial
contracts in dispute in Mitsubishi and Vimar.
An employment contract, unlike a large commercial contract, is
often negotiated by labor unions. The unions, while seeking to preserve
the interests of its members, are substantially disadvantaged in bargain-
ing power. The resulting collective bargaining agreement often stipu-
lates to an unfavorable choice of law and diminishes the litigant's rights
in court.
The Supreme Court sought to curb this practice when it announced
its decisions in Gardner-Denver and Mitsubishi. However, 14 Penn
Plaza has left room for debate regarding the Court's stance on union-
negotiated waivers in collective bargaining agreements. In Wright, the
Court refused to compel arbitration of the claimant's ADA claims
because the contract did not expressly submit those claims to arbitra-
tion.292 However, the Court refused to rule on whether submission of
those claims under foreign law would have made the agreement void.
Then again, in 14 Penn Plaza, the Court reiterated that substantive
waiver of a litigant's rights is void; however, procedural waiver, such as
vesting the claims in an alternative forum for resolution was valid.293
This would lead the belief that arbitration agreements, such as the one in
Lindo, are void. However, the Court has failed to announce what sub-
stantive waiver is, and if union-negotiated waiver of U.S. statutory rights
for protected class members qualifies.
Despite its refusal to issue a definitive holding, the Supreme Court
has counseled hesitation in prospectively waiving a litigant's rights
through contractual agreements. The Court has reiterated its opinion on
union-negotiated waiver in several cases. However, the Eleventh Circuit
refused to adhere to the Court's direction and compelled arbitration of
Lindo's Jones Act claims to Nicaragua under Bahamian law. The deci-
sion not only went against the Supreme Court's dicta, it deviated from
the Circuit's precedent in Thomas. The decision is an example of why
Congress should pass the Arbitration Fairness Act.
Union members and consumers should not be left to defend a con-
tract that they did not have time to review or power to negotiate. The
legal fiction that employees and consumers agree to the terms of their
contract should be displaced by reality. This fiction is what allows cases
292. Wright, 525 U.S. at 79.
293. 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 265.
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like Lindo to stand as precedent in the books. Judges and activists seek-
ing fairness and justice should criticize the precedent allowing union-
negotiated waiver of individualized U.S. statutory rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Lindo raises several valid con-
cerns over the direction of the Federal Arbitration Act and its interplay
with domestic laws. The proposed amendments in the Arbitration Fair-
ness Act would aid courts in preserving the rights afforded by Congress.
Statutory rights, which unions and classes have fought so vigorously to
gain, should not be subject to waiver without such waiver being know-
ing and intelligent. Arguably, waiver cannot be deemed knowing and
intelligent when the litigant often lacks the legal knowledge and exper-
tise to understand the waiver. Courts and Congress should act accord-
ingly and protect class members from being stripped of their rights. It is
to the litigants' detriment that they were a part of a union negotiated
collective bargaining agreement.
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